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APPLYING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO




NEW JERSEY v. TOWNSHIP OF WASHINGTON,
850 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1988)
The fourth amendment' protects individuals from unreasonable gov-
ernmental searches and seizures.2 Recently, public employees have
used the fourth amendment to challenge random drug testing imple-
mented by their employers,3 alleging that such testing constitutes an
unreasonable search.4 In Policemen's Benevolent Association of New
1. The fourth amendment provides that "[tihe right of the people to be secured in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated .... U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The fourth amendment protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures applies to the states through the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949).
2. The fourth amendment protects people and not simply places against unreasona-
ble searches and seizures. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-53 (1967) (govern-
ment's electronically listening to and recording petitioner's phone conversation
constituted a search and seizure under the fourth amendment). See Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643, 645, 660 (1961) (government could not present evidence at trial of Mapp's
possession of obscene materials because government conducted an unlawful search); see
also Wolf, 338 U.S. at 27 (fourth amendment protection against arbitrary intrusion by
the state is basic to a free society).
3. For a discussion of the application of the fourth amendment to drug testing of
public employees, see generally Note, Mandatory Drug Testing of Public Sector Employ-
ees: Constitutional Implications, 65 U. DET. L. REV. 315 (1988); Ayers, Constitutional
Issues Implicated by Public Employee Drug Testing, 14 WM. MrrCHELL L. Rnv. 337
(1988).
4. Note, supra note 3, at 316. Public employers requiring random drug testing pro-
grams include fire and police departments, municipal utility companies, and school
boards. See, e.g., Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D.N.J. 1986) (fire
fighters); City of Palm Bay v. Bauman, 475 So. 2d 1322 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)
(police officers); Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Ga. 1985) (municipal
utility company employees); Patchogue-Medford Congress of Teachers v. Board of
Educ., 119 A.D.2d 35, 505 N.Y.S.2d 888 (1986), aff'd, 70 N.Y.2d 57, 510 N.E.2d 325,
517 N.Y.S.2d 456 (1987) (teachers).
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Jersey v. Township of Washington,5 the Third Circuit held that random
drug testing of city police officers was constitutional under the fourth
amendment even though the city lacked individualized, reasonable sus-
picion of drug use.6
In Policemen's Benevolent Association, the Mayor of the Township of
Washington, in response to a Presidential Executive Order7 calling for
a drug-free workplace,8 implemented a mandatory drug testing pro-
gram for all municipal employees.9 The Policemen's Benevolent Asso-
5. 850 F.2d 133 (3d. Cir. 1988).
6. Id. at 134. In Loworn v. City of Chattanooga, 647 F. Supp. 875 (E.D. Tenn.
1986), aff'd, 846 F.2d 1539 (6th Cir. 1988), the court noted that there must be "some
quantum of individualized suspicion before [urine] tests can be carried out. This quan-
tum may be denoted as 'reasonable suspicion.'," 647 F. Supp. at 880. Reasonable suspi-
cion requires some articulable basis for suspecting the particular employee. Id. at 881.
See City of Palm Bay, 475 So. 2d at 1326 (to justify an intrusion based on reasonable
suspicion, officials must find specific objective facts and draw rational inferences from
the facts in light of their experience); Taylor v. O'Grady, 669 F. Supp. 1422, 1436 (N.D.
Ill. 1987) (a search is reasonable under the fourth amendment if, at its inception, reason-
able grounds exist to suspect work-related drug use, and the means adopted relate to the
objective of the search and are not excessively intrusive).
7. Exec. Order No. 12,564, 3 C.F.R. 224 (1987) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 7307
(1988)).
8. 850 F.2d at 134. The presidential executive order calling for a drug-free work-
place provides in part:
The Federal government, as the largest employer in the Nation, can and should
show the way towards achieving drug-free workplaces through a program designed
to offer drug users a helping hand and, at the same time, demonstrating to drug
users and potential drug users that drugs will not be tolerated in the Federal
workplace...
Section 1. Drug-Free Workplace
(a) Federal employees are required to refrain from the use of illegal drugs.
(b) The use of illegal drugs by Federal employees, whether on duty or off duty,
is contrary to the efficiency of the service.
(c) Persons who use illegal drugs are not suitable for Federal employment.
Section 3. Drug Testing Programs
(a) The head of each Executive agency shall established a program test for the
use of illegal drugs by employees in sensitive positions...
(c) [The head of each Executive agency is authorized to test an employee for
illegal drug use under the following circumstances:
(1) When there is a reasonable suspicion that any employee uses illegal
drugs;
(2) In an examination authorized by the agency regarding an accident or
unsafe practice....
(d) The head of each Executive agency is authorized to test any applicant for
illegal drug use.
Exec. Order No. 12,564, 3 C.F.R. 224 (1987) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 7307 (1988)).
9. 850 F.2d at 134.
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ciation of New Jersey filed suit on behalf of the police officers of the
Township,' ° alleging that the drug testing plan was unconstitutional
under the fourth amendment.' The Association specifically chal-
lenged those aspects of the plan 12 calling for random testing of police
officers. 3 The United States District Court for the District of New
Jersey granted the Association's request for summary judgment.14 On
appeal, the Third Circuit reversed, holding that random drug testing of
police officers did not constitute an unreasonable search and seizure. 5
10. Policemen's Benevolent Ass'n of New Jersey v. Township of Washington, 672
F. Supp. 779 (D.N.J. 1986), rev'd., 850 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1988). The Policemen's Be-
nevolent Association and the Association's president, Edmund Giordano, sued the
Township, the Mayor, and the Township Council. Id. at 780. While still in the district
court, the Association agreed to dismiss the Township Council as a defendant. Id. at
781.
11. 672 F. Supp. at 780. The Association also moved temporarily to restrain the
Township from implementing the plan. Id. The district court granted the motion and
ordered the Township to show why the court should not grant a preliminary injunction.
Id.
12. The district court lifted the restraining order on October 8, 1986, when the
Township indicated that it would not test current employees until it had formalized a
drug testing plan. Id. at 781. The Township indicated that it would formulate program
guidelines and submit them for judicial review. Consequently, the court denied the
Association's request for a preliminary injunction and dissolved the temporary re-
straints. Id.
The Township submitted a revised drug testing plan that established policies and
procedures for testing and controlling unauthorized drug use among Township person-
nel. Id. The procedures listed two methods for the detection of illegal drug use: (1)
testing individual employees based on reasonable suspicion; and (2) testing employees
based on a universal random urinalysis procedure. The plan further required annual
physical examinations including a urinalysis drug test for all municipal employees. Id.
The Township gave its employees sixty-days notice prior to implementing the program.
Id. at 782. The plan permitted employees to urinate privately unless the employer rea-
sonably suspected that an employee might tamper with this sample. Id. After actual
testing, anonymous sampling containers protected employee privacy. Id. Finally, the
Township could utilize final test results only for disciplinary and not criminal purposes.
Id.
13. The Association challenged the constitutionality of three provisions of the re-
vised plan: random testing of police officers; mass testing of the entire police force; and
testing as part of pretextual physical examinations which are not bona-fide medical ex-
aminations given in the ordinary course of business and as a matter of the Township's
policy for its police officers. Policemen's Benevolent Ass'n, 850 F.2d at 135.
14. 672 F. Supp. at 796. The district court held the drug testing plan unconstitu-
tional under the fourth amendment as an unreasonable search and seizure. Id. The
court enjoined the Township from requiring police officers to submit urine samples for
drug testing unless individualized, reasonable suspicion existed that a particular officer
used illegal drugs. Id.
15. 850 F.2d at 141-42.
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The fourth amendment protects an individual's reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy.16 A court will consider a search reasonable if, viewed
objectively, it is justifiable under the circumstances.17 In the employ-
ment context, this privacy interest is weighed against the employer's
discretion to enforce reasonable conditions of employment.18
The Supreme Court only recently addressed mandatory drug testing
of public employees. 9 However, more than twenty years ago, in
Schmerber v. California,2 ° the Supreme Court held that an involuntary
blood test 2 ' constituted a search within the meaning of the fourth
amendment.22 The Court reasoned that an individual has a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the personal information blood contains.
23
16. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984). See also Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (the fourth amendment pro-
tects actual expectations of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable).
17. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (citing Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
18. See Bratcher v. United States, 149 F.2d 742, 745-46 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 325
U.S. 885 (1945) (physical examination bf military inductee, resulting in discovery of
drug use, was not an unlawful search and seizure even though the government used
results in criminal prosecution); United States v. Bunkers, 521 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 989 (1975) (warrantless search of postal employee's locker for
stolen mail did not violate fourth amendment).
19. See National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, No. 86-1879 (March 21,
1989) (LEXIS, Genfed Library, U.S. file). The Supreme Court held the customs ser-
vice's mandatory drug testing of employees applying for positions directly involving
interdiction of illegal drugs was reasonable despite the absence of reasonable, individu-
alized suspicion. Although the Court affirmed the constitutionality of the Von Raab
drug testing program, the Von Raab facts involved employees seeking sensitive positions
in drug enforcement. Hence, the Court's decision seems to have limited application
regarding the constitutionality of public employee drug testing. See infra notes 57-64
and accompanying text for additional discussion of Von Raab.
20. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
21. In Schmerber petitioner was hospitalized following an automobile accident. Af-
ter smelling alcohol on petitioner's breath, a police officer arrested petitioner and
charged him with driving while intoxicated. At the hospital, the officer directed a phy-
sician to conduct a blood test over petitioner's objection. Id. at 758-59.
22. Id. at 767. Petitioner argued that the involuntary blood extraction constituted
an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the fourth amendment. Id. at 759.
The court relied on the amendment's guarantee of the individual's right to be secure in
his or her person in determining that an involuntary blood test was a search under the
fourth amendment. Id. at 767. The court held, however, that the blood alcohol test was
a reasonable search and seizure.
23. Id. at 767-70. Since evidence of blood-alcohol content could determine one's
guilt or innocence to a charge of driving while intoxicated, the court believed that the
fourth amendment privacy interest required probable cause in order to conduct the test.
Id. at 770-71. The Schmerber court found the police officer's search to be reasonable
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By analogy to Schmerber, many courts have held that urinalysis2 4
constitutes a search under the fourth amendment.25 In McDonnell v.
Hunter,26 the Eighth Circuit compared urine testing to an involuntary
blood test.2 The court conceded that, unlike blood testing, the
"seizure" of urine does not require bodily intrusion.28 Nevertheless,
the court noted, a person normally discharges urine with a reasonable
expectation of privacy 29 and has an interest in safeguarding personal
information contained therein."0 Hence, the McDonnell court held
that because urinalysis intrudes upon the right of individuals to be se-
cure in their "persons,"31 such testing is a search and seizure under the
because the officer had probable cause to suspect petitioner's intoxication, and the test
administered was safe. Id. at 771-72. See also Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp.
1507, 1513 (D.N.J. 1986) ("Each individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in
the personal 'information' bodily fluids contain.").
24. Urinalysis is the most common drug testing method. Other methods include
blood testing and polygraph tests. Susser, Legal Issues Raised by Drugs in the Work-
place, 36 LAB. L.J. 42, 46 (1985). The EMIT (Enzyme Multiplied Immunoassay Tech-
nique) is the most common test used for initial screening of urine samples. Experts
estimate the EMIT test to be 97% to 99% accurate with errors attributed mainly to
sample mix-ups and misreadings. Id. at 48. The gas chromatography/mass spectrome-
try (GCMS) test, which is reportedly 100% accurate, is commonly used to confirm
positive EMIT tests. Ager, Ready, Set... Will You Go?, Det. Free Press, Nov. 30,
1986, at 14-15.
25. See, eg., National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 176
(5th Cir. 1987), aff'd in part, No. 86-1879 (March 21, 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed Library,
U.S. file) (search of U.S. Customs Service employees); McDonnell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d
1302, 1307 (8th Cir. 1987), (search of correctional officers); City of Palm Bay v.
Bauman, 475 So. 2d 1322, 1324 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985), and Bostic v. McClendon,
650 F. Supp. 245, 249 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (police officers); Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643
F. Supp. 1507, 1513 (D.N.J. 1986), and Lovvor v. City of Chattanooga, 647 F. Supp.
875, 879 (E.D. Tenn. 1986), aff'd., 846 F.2d 1539 (6th Cir. 1988) (city fire fighters);
Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 986 (1986) (horse
jockeys).
26. 809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987). McDonnell addressed the constitutionality of
urine testing for correctional institution employees.
27. Id. at 1307 (citing Capua, 643 F. Supp. at 1513). Medical labs analyze both
urine and blood to determine physiological facts. Id. See also Storms v. Coughlin, 600
F. Supp. 1214, 1217-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (urinalysis requires the same level of scrutiny
as blood testing).
28. McDonnell, 809 F.2d at 1307.
29. Id.
30. Id. The Supreme Court recognized an individual's right to privacy in medical
information in Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 600 (1977).
31. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV. See supra note 1.
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fourth amendment.32
Although courts generally extend fourth amendment protection to
urinalysis,33 courts differ as to the constitutionality of programs that
test public employees without reasonable, individualized suspicion of
drug use.34 Most courts have ruled that such programs violate the
fourth amendment.35 In Capua v. City of Plainfield,36 the United
States District Court for the District of New Jersey adopted the reason-
able suspicion standard to determine the constitutionality of random
drug testing of city fire fighters.37 In Capua, the fire commissioner or-
dered fire fighters to submit to an unannounced urinalysis test.38 The
test lacked written guidelines and formal procedures for collecting,
32. McDonnell, 809 F.2d at 1307.
33. Courts generally agree that urinalysis is a search within the meaning of the
fourth amendment. See supra notes 25-32 and accompanying text (presenting the case
history which developed this consensus).
34. Compare Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Ga. 1985) (uphold-
ing mandatory urinalysis without reasonable suspicion for municipal employees who
worked around high voltage wires) with Loworn v. City of Chattanooga, 647 F. Supp.
875 (E.D. Tenn. 1986), aff'd, 846 F.2d 1539 (6th Cir. 1988) (reasonable suspicion re-
quired to conduct mandatory urine testing); see supra note 6 (discussing the require-
ment of reasonable, individualized suspicion).
35. See, ag., Bostic v. McClendon, 650 F. Supp. 245, 250 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (police
department allowed urine testing only on basis of reasonable suspicion); Lovorn, 647 F.
Supp. at 879-83 (random drug testing of fire fighters and police officers violates the
fourth amendment); Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1517-20 (D.N.J.
1986) (surprise testing of fire fighters is an unreasonable search in violation of the fourth
amendment); City of Palm Bay v. Bauman, 475 So. 2d 1322, 1325-26 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1985) (police officers not required to supply urine samples in the absence of rea-
sonable suspicion supported by the circumstances); Feliciano v. City of Cleveland, 661
F. Supp. 578, 591-92 (N.D. Ohio 1987) (urinalysis testing of police academy cadets is an
unreasonable search in the absence of reasonable, individualized suspicion); Turner v.
Fraternal Order of Police, 500 A.2d 1005, 1008-09 (D.C. App. 1985) (urinalysis testing
of police officers held reasonable where employer limited testing to employees suspected
of drug use); but see Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136, 1142 (3d. Cir.), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 986 (1986) (random urine testing and daily breathalyzer tests for jockeys held
constitutional); Rushton v. Nebraska Pub. Power Dist., 653 F. Supp. 1510, 1523-25 (D.
Neb. 1987) (random urine testing for security guards and licensed operators at a nuclear
power plant held constitutional).
36. 643 F. Supp. 1507 (1986).
37. Id. at 1517-20.
38. Id. at 1511. At 7:00 a.m. the Fire Chief and Director of Public Affairs and
Safety entered the fire station, locked the doors, and awakened all fire fighters present
on the premises. Id. The department required each employee to submit a urine sample
while under the surveillance and supervision of bonded testing agents employed by the
city. Id.
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testing, and utilizing the test information." In evaluating the reasona-
bleness of the search, the Capua court employed a balancing test4° that
weighed the city's need for the search against the intrusiveness of the
test to fire fighters. 1 The court concluded that the test's intrusiveness
outweighed the city's interest in eradicating drug use.4 2 The court
found that a "reasonable suspicion" standard was necessary to protect
individuals against arbitrary governmental searches. 3 The Capua
court held that, absent reasonable suspicion, the random drug testing
program constituted an unreasonable search and seizure proscribed by
the fourth amendment."
Several courts have developed an exception to Capua's reasonable
suspicion standard where searches are made pursuant to administrative
inspection schemes in closely regulated industries.45 In Shoemaker v.
39. Id. at 1511-12.
40. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). Courts determine
whether a search is reasonable under the fourth amendment by balancing the govern-
ment's need to search against the individual's right to privacy. Id. at 536-37. Courts
have consistently adopted this balancing test. Capua applied a balancing test to random
drug testing.
41. 643 F. Supp. at 1517-19.
42. Id. at 1520. The Capua court noted that the act of urination has traditionally
been a private function, and that a urine test conducted under close surveillance by a
government representative, no matter how professionally or courteously handled, tends
to be a very embarrassing and humiliating experience. Id. at 1514.
Examining the city's interest in eradicating drug use, the court noted that the city
provided no specific proof that any individual fire fighter used drugs. Id. at 1516. Fur-
thermore, the city did not show an increase in fire-related accidents or complaints of
inadequate fire protection. Id.
43. Id. at 1517.
44. Id. at 1522. Adopting the holding in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757
(1966), the Capua court first found that the governmental taking of a urine specimen
was a search and seizure under the fourth amendment. 643 F. Supp. at 1513. The
Capua court then applied a balancing test. Id. See supra notes 20-32 and accompany-
ing text (discussing the Schmerber decision).
45. See Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136, 1142-43 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 986 (1986) (random urine testing for jockeys in the heavily regulated horse-racing
industry held constitutional); Rushton v. Nebraska Pub. Power Dist., 653 F. Supp.
1510, 1524-25 (D. Neb. 1987) (warrantless searches, including urine testing, of employ-
ees who had unescorted access to protected areas of state nuclear power plant held
constitutional where public employer was subject to a comprehensive regulatory
scheme); McDonnell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302, 1308-09 (8th Cir. 1987) (random urinal-
ysis of a state prison employee who had regular contact with prisoners housed in me-
dium to maximum security prisons held reasonable).
Prior to Shoemaker and Rushton, courts permitted warrantless searches of premises
that were subject to administrative inspections. See, e-g., Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S.
1989]
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Handel," the Third Circuit applied the administrative search excep-
tion to warrantless breath and urine testing of jockeys47 participating
in the heavily regulated48 New Jersey horse-racing industry.49 The
court examined the justifications for the administrative search excep-
fion.50 First, the Shoemaker court noted the strong state interest in
conducting drug testing. Because New Jersey derived substantial reve-
nue from horse racing,51 the state had a legitimate interest in maintain-
ing public confidence in the industry.52 Secondly, pervasive regulation
in the industry53 diminished the jockey's expectations of privacy.5 4
Having determined that the drug testing was within the administrative
search exception, the Shoemaker court noted that the state's adminis-
594, 602-05 (1981) (underground mines); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316-17
(1972) (firearms dealer); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 76-77
(1970) (liquor industry).
The Shoemaker and Rushton courts considered whether the administrative search
exception reached warrantless testing of persons involved in highly regulated activity.
See infra notes 48-54 and accompanying text (discussing the exception applied to
persons).
46. 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 986 (1986).
47. The New Jersey Racing Commission adopted regulations governing horse rac-
ing. One regulation permitted the State Racing Steward to direct jockeys to undergo
breathalyzer tests. 795 F.2d at 1138. Another regulation subjected jockeys to a random
urine test. Id. The jockeys in Shoemaker argued that without individualized suspicion
of drug use, random urinalysis and warrantless production of breath sample violated the
fourth amendment. Id. at 1141.
48. Id. The New Jersey Horse Racing Commission has broad rulemaking author-
ity. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:5-22 (West 1988). The Commission has the authority to pre-
scribe conditions for the issuance and revocation of licenses. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:5-33
(West 1988).
All licensees are aware that the industry is subject to intense state regulation. Shoe-
maker, 795 F.2d at 1141. The regulation in question, N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13, § 70-
14A. 11 (1985), requires jockeys to submit to random daily blood-alcohol testing and
urinalysis. Id. at 1139-40.
49. 795 F.2d at 1142.
50. Id.
51. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 5:5-64, -64.1 (West 1988).
52. 795 F.2d at 1138. The court ruled that New Jersey has a strong interest in
assuring the public of the integrity of persons engaged in the horse-racing industry and
that drug testing effectively demonstrates that such persons are not influenced by drugs
and alcohol. Id at 1142.
53. See supra note 48 (discussing the Horse Racing Commission's broad rulemaking
authority).
54. 795 F.2d at 1142. By accepting a state license and entering a highly regulated
industry, jockeys were aware that the Racing Commission would exercise its authority
to administer urine tests. Id.
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tration of the searches had to be reasonable. 5 The court found the
urine testing of jockeys reasonable because a strict administrative
scheme protected jockeys from standardless invasions of privacy. 6
In National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,57 the Fifth Cir-
cuit held constitutional a drug testing policy imposed by the United
States Customs Service as a condition to promotion to sensitive posi-
tions within the agency. Although the Customs Service was not highly
regulated," the Von Raab court drew an analogy to cases applying the
administrative search exception.59 The court reasoned that the govern-
ment had a substantial interest in ensaring the effectiveness of employ-
ees who occupied sensitive positions in drug enforcement.' In
considering the employees' privacy interests, the Von Raab court noted
55. Id at 1143.
56. Id. An envelope holds the names of all jockeys participating in a given race. A
representative draws the names of three to five jockeys for testing. Id. at 1140. If a
jockey's name is drawn more than three times over seven days, the steward disregards
the choice and draws another name. Id The selected jockeys provide urine samples
following their last race. The jockeys also fill out forms certifying the use of prescrip-
tion or nonprescription drugs. Id. Finally, the Racing Commission sends the anony-
mous urine samples to a lab for testing. Id. Test results remain confidential and may
only be used in an administrative or judicial hearing. Id. See N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13,
§ 70-14A.1l(e) (1985).
57. 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987), aff'd in part, No. 86-1879 (March 21, 1989)
(LEXIS, Genfed Library, U.S. file). Pursuant to a directive by the Commissioner of the
United States Customs Service, the Service implemented a urinalysis drug testing pro-
gram for applicants selected for three kinds of jobs deemed sensitive: those that directly
involve the interdiction of illicit drugs, require handling a firearm, or involve access to
classified information. Id. at 173. At first the Service only tested applicants for initial
employment. After two months, however, the Service extended the prograni to current
employees who sought transfers to sensitive positions. Id.
58. Id. at 179-80.
59. Id. The court stated:
The exception occurs when warrantless searches are necessary to accomplishment
of the regulatory scheme and when the very existence of the federal regulatory
program diminishes the reasonable expectations of privacy of those involved in the
industry. While this case does not involve a highly regulated private industry, it
calls for the same kind of balance between the need for each search and the inva-
sion of the individual's expectation of privacy.
Id.
60. The United States Customs Service viewed the prohibition of narcotics smug-
gling as its top priority. 816 F.2d at 173. The court found that the government had a
strong interest in employing individuals for key positions in drug enforcement who were
not drug users themselves. Id. An employee's use of the illegal drugs he was hired to
interdict would compromise the employee's ability to prohibit drug smuggling. Id. at
178. Furthermore, the employee's drug habit would undermine public confidence in the
integrity of the Customs Service. Id.
1989]
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that individuals seeking employment in drug interdiction know that the
government may inquire into their personal use of drugs.61 Hence,
Customs Service personnel had a diminished expectation of privacy.6
2
The court found the government's administration of the search reason-
able within the meaning of the fourth amendment because the Service
tested only those employees who were seeking to transfer to sensitive
positions.63 The reasonableness of the testing program was also evi-
denced by the custom service's use of the most accurate drug tests
available.' 4
In Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga,65 Chattanooga fire fighters chal-
61. Id. at 180.
62. Id. The court noted that in order to assure integrity and competence, the gov-
ernment could subject its employees to searches or other restraints on their liberties that
would be impermissible without the employment relationship. Id. at 178. Since the
program drug-tested employees seeking sensitive positions in drug interception, the
court believed that "the tolerance usually extended for private activities does not extend
to [these employees] if investigation discloses their use of drugs." Id. at 180.
63. Id. at 177. The Service mandated drug testing only for those individuals who
voluntarily sought transfer to a more sensitive position. Id. These employees knew of
the urinalysis requirement in advance. Id. at 178. An employee could forego drug
screening, with no penalty except loss of the transfer sought, by withdrawing his appli-
cation before the urine test. Id.
In the drug screening process, the employee entered a restroom stall and produced
the urine sample privately. Id. at 174. An observer remained in the restroom to collect
the sample, but did not visually observe the act of urination. Id. The Von Raab testing
procedures ensured greater privacy than those conducted in Capua. Id. at 177. See
supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text (discussing the Capua drug screening
process).
64. 816 F.2d at 177. Because test results were either positive or negative, there was
no room for official discretion in test interpretation. Id. The Customs Service used the
EMIT test for initial screening and the GCMS test to confirm positive samples. Id. at
174. See supra note 24 (discussing these tests).
On March 21, 1989 the Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit's decision that the
drug testing was reasonable under the fourth amendment. National Treasury Employ-
ees Union v. Von Raab, No. 86-1879 (March 21, 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed Library, U.S.
file). Agreeing with the Fifth Circuit, the Court believed that the government's interest
outweighed the privacy interests of employees seeking promotion to sensitive positions.
The Court stated that the government has a compelling interest in ensuring that front-
line interdiction personnel are physically fit and possessed of unimpeachable integrity
and judgment. The employees, however, have a diminished expectation of privacy by
virtue of their special positions. Finally, the Court noted that employee privacy is ade-
quately protected since the program narrowly and specifically defines the circumstances
justifying testing, employees know that they must be tested, and employees are aware of
the service's testing procedures. Even with the Supreme Court's aflirmance of the drug
testing program, the Court's 5-4 result suggests that the issue of public employee drug
testing remains significant.
65. 647 F. Supp. 875 (E.D. Tenn. 1986), aff'd, 846 F.2d 1539 (6th Cir. 1988).
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lenged the constitutionality of the city's random drug testing pro-
gram.66 The Chattanooga Fire Commissioner had instituted a mass
urinalysis program 6 7 without establishing written and standardized
testing procedures. 68 Initially, the court found that urinalysis consti-
tuted a search and seizure under the fourth amendment.69 Next, the
court balanced the city's need for testing against the fire fighters' pri-
vacy interests.7° The court conceded that the city's need to search for
drug use was compelling, since drugs could impair a fire fighter's abil-
ity to perform inherently hazardous activity.7 1 The court also con-
ceded that fire fighters, as city employees, are not entitled to the same
expectation of privacy as the general public. 72 The court concluded,
however, that fire fighters have, to a certain degree, an expectation of
privacy in the act of urination.73 Like Capua, the court held that the
66. Id. at 881.
67. Id. at 877. In early 1984, the city discovered "civilian" employees of the police
or fire department smoking marijuana. In early 1985, the Chattanooga Fire Commis-
sioner decided to administer mandatory urine tests to all members of the fire depart-
ment. Id. The Commissioner lacked any objective indication that drugs affected any
individual fire fighter or the department as a whole. Id. at 878. The Commissioner
notified all fire fighters that they must report to an independent laboratory for blood and
urine testing. The fire fighters gave urine samples while under the direct observation of
an assistant fire chief. Id. at 877. The Commissioner suspended several fire fighters
who tested positive and released their names to the press. Id. at 878. As a result of
rumors that some fire fighters had switched urine samples, the Commissioner retested
the entire fire department in the summer of 1986. Id. This proposed 1986 testing
formed the basis of the lawsuit. Id. at 879.
68. Id. at 877. The program lacked written testing methods, standards for analyz-
ing urine specimens, and procedures for implementing discipline and releasing test re-
sults. Id.
69. Id. at 879. As in Shoemaker, the court compared the urine test to the blood test
at issue in Schmerber. Id. See supra notes 20-32 and accompanying text (discussing
application of the Schmerber search and seizure analysis to drug testing).
70. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
71. Lovvorn, 647 F. Supp. at 879. Expert testimony confirmed that marijuana could
detrimentally affect perception, decision-making time, short-term memory, and motor
skills. Id.
72. Id. at 880. See also National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d
170, 178 (5th Cir. 1987), aff'd in part, No. 86-1879 (March 21, 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed
Library, U.S. file) (within limits, government employees face searches or restraints on
their liberty that would be impermissible without the public employment relationship);
but cf Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482, 491 (N.D. Ga. 1985) (employees do
not surrender their fourth amendment rights simply because they work for the
government).
73. Lovvorn, 647 F. Supp. at 880. According to the court, the degree of intrusion
engendered by a urine test varied among individuals. Id. Some may not mind urine
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city must show a reasonable, individualized suspicion of drug use
before the city could conduct a urine test.74
The city also argued that the administrative search exception estab-
lished in Shoemaker should apply in this case.75 The Lovvorn court
rejected this request by distinguishing Shoemaker.76 The Lovvorn
court reasoned that, unlike the jockeys in Shoemaker, the Chattanooga
fire fighters were not employed in a highly regulated industry.77 More-
over, because Chattanooga's drug testing plan lacked clearly defined
standards, it lacked the procedural safeguards present in Shoemaker.78
In Policemen's Benevolent Association of New Jersey v. Township of
Washington,79 the Third Circuit held that the Shoemaker court's ad-
ministrative search exception applied to the Township's drug testing of
its police officers."0 Initially, the court noted that the Township's test-
ing procedures were similar to those upheld in Shoemaker.81 The
testing while others may take great offense. Thus, the Lovvorn court believed that the
Chattanooga testing procedure interfered to some degree with the fire fighters' subjec-
tive expectation of privacy. Id.
74. Id. at 881. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text (discussing the Capua
court's holding that reasonable suspicion is required for random drug testing of city fire
fighters).
Chattanooga had no less intrusive means of conducting effective testing. Thus, the
court found the direct observation of urination constitutional. Id. at 880 n.5. As a
prerequisite to drug testing, however, the court still required a finding of reasonable
suspicion that a fire fighter used illegal drugs. Id. at 881-82. But cf Capua v. City of
Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1514-15 (D.N.J. 1986) ("direct" observation of urination
is unconstitutional).
75. Loyvorn, 647 F. Supp. at 881. In Shoemaker, the Third Circuit applied the ad-
ministrative search exception because the state strictly regulated horse racing. See
supra notes 48-56 and accompanying text.
76. Id. at 881.
77. Id. By rejecting the administrative search exception, the court implied that the
fire department was not highly regulated. As further implication that the fire depart-
ment lacked intense regulation, the Lovvorn court rejected the City's request to charac-
terize the fire department as a "paramilitary organization." Id. at 882.
78. Id. at 881. The court stated that administrative search exception cases relied on
clearly defined testing standards to protect individual privacy expectations. Id. See
supra note 56 and accompanying text (discussing the procedural safeguards in Shoe-
maker). The Lovvorn court reasoned that even if the administrative search exception
did otherwise apply, Chattanooga's lack of clearly defined standards in its testing pro-
gram rendered the exception inapplicable. Id.
79. 850 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1988).
80. Id. at 135-36. See supra notes 45-56 and accompanying text (discussing the
Shoemaker rationale).
81. 850 F.2d at 136. The court noted that the plan's provision for random selection
for urinalysis resembled the plan upheld in Shoemaker. Id. As further similarity, the
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court then reviewed the constitutional requirements which must be met
to validate a warrantless administrative search,82 emphasizing that
Shoemaker controlled only if the Township's police department consti-
tuted a highly regulated industry."3
To determine whether Shoemaker controlled, the Third Circuit first
addressed the state's interest in testing police officers for illegal drugs.
The court believed that the Township had a strong public interest in
maintaining a drug free police force.84 The court noted that the state's
need for public confidence in law enforcement officials was significantly
greater than the state's need to preserve confidence in the integrity of
the horse-racing industry. 5 Next, the Third Circuit considered the
justifiable privacy expectations of the officers. The detailed regulations
governing the police force8 6 convinced the court that police officers
faced more stringent regulations than jockeys.87 Thus, the pervasive
regulation of the industry diminished the police officers' expectations of
privacy. Finding Shoemaker applicable, the Third Circuit held that
the Township's drug testing program for police officers was constitu-
tional under the fourth amendment.
8 8
The Third Circuit's decision in Policemen's Benevolent Association
further complicates the issue of what standards courts should use to
determine the constitutionality of governmental drug testing of public
employees. The court narrowed the range of constitutional drug tests
universal annual urinalysis for police officers was the equivalent of the daily
breathalyzer test for jockeys. Id. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (discussing
the Township's drug testing guidelines); see supra note 56 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the Shoemaker drug testing guidelines).
82. 850 F.2d at 136. The court stated that the dispositive questions were (1)
whether the state had a strong interest in preventing drug use among police officers; and
(2) whether the pervasive regulation of the police industry reduced justifiable privacy
expectations of the officers. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 141. The court explained that Washington Township police officers are
called upon for duty at all times and are endowed with the power to use lawful force to
arrest and detain. Id. The court concluded that the need for public confidence in and
respect for public officials who have the power to use lawful force was significantly
greater than the state's need to ensure integrity of the horse-racing industry. Id.
86. Id. at 137-41. The court listed the regulations governing the police force.
87. Id. at 141. The regulations included a myriad of topics: standards of conduct,
duty responsibilities, manner of dress, carrying equipment off duty, alcoholic beverages,
drugs, and personal appearance. Id.
88. Id. The Third Circuit noted that while some courts have both followed and
distinguished Shoemaker, id. at 141 n.3, it was "not free ... to disregard it." Id. at 141.
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by recognizing that the government's interest in testing must be com-
pelling in order to outweigh the employees' privacy expectations.8 9
However, the court's determination that city police departments are a
highly regulated industry signifies an expansion of the administrative
search exception established in Shoemaker.90 It is unclear whether
courts will apply the administrative search exception to other police
departments whose regulations differ from those in Policemen's Benevo-
lent Association.
The Third Circuit also failed to conduct an effective analysis of the
privacy expectations of the officers.91 Instead, the court summarily
concluded that police officers were heavily regulated without clearly
demonstrating the pervasiveness of the regulation sufficient to warrant
application of the administrative search exception.92 While police of-
ficers may have a diminished expectation of privacy due to the public
nature of their work,93 the Third Circuit's decision subjects many inno-
cent police officers to random urine testing when less intrusive means
to detect drug use exist. For instance, the Township could directly
observe police officers for suspected drug use or monitor public com-
plaints about police performance.
The Policemen's Benevolent Association decision exemplifies the con-
tinuing constitutional dilemma surrounding mandatory drug testing of
public employees. Prior holdings have emphasized the need for indi-
vidualized, reasonable suspicion and detailed procedural guidelines to
89. In National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir.
1987), aff'd in part, No. 86-1879 (March 21, 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed Library, U.S. file),
the court found that because employees were involved in drug interdiction, the Customs
Service's interest in testing its employees for drugs was compelling. Id. at 173. In
Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D.N.J. 1986), the court held that the
city's interest in conducting random drug testing of fire fighters did not outweigh the
fire fighters' privacy expectations, especially because the city lacked individualized sus-
picion of drug use. Id. at 1516.
90. The Shoemaker court applied the exception to horse jockeys heavily regulated
by the New Jersey Racing Commission. By drawing an analogy to a regulated industry,
the Von Raab court applied the exception only to employees seeking transfer to sensitive
positions in the Customs Service. See supra notes 48-66 and accompanying text.
91. The court devoted a majority of its opinion to listing the regulations governing
Township police officers. The court ended its inquiry upon determining that the Town-
ship had a significant need to instill public confidence in law enforcement officials and
never addressed the privacy expectations of the police officers.
92. Without going into any analysis, the court stated that the regulations speak for
themselves and are evidence that the police force is highly regulated. Id. at 141.
93. Courts have reached different conclusions as to whether public employment di-
minishes an individual's privacy interest. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
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protect the constitutional rights of public employees who are subjected
to mandatory drug testing. The Policemen's Benevolent Association ap-
proach forces police officers to undergo urine testing even if the govern-
ment fails to show reasonable, individualized suspicion of drug use.
The Supreme Court has begun to articulate a constitutional94 standard
for examining random urine testing of government employees. How-
ever, the Policemen's Benevolent Association decision suggests that the
war on drug testing will continue.
Rita M. Nichols
94. See supra note 64 (discussing the Von Raab decision). Since the Von Raab deci-
sion limits mandatory drug testing to employees in sensitive positions and represents the
Supreme Court's first encounter with public employee drug testing, it remains to be seen
if the decision provides proper guidance for the constitutionality of mandatory drug
testing programs.
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